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EvmENCE-WIBETAPPING AND THE CoNGREss-The familiar cry 
that "there ought to be a law" is frequently raised concerning the prac-
tice which Justice Holmes long ago characterized as "dirty business"1-
the tapping of telephone wires. Although existing legislation on both 
federal2 and state3 levels deals with interception of telephone messages, 
the almost universal conclusion of commentators on the subject has 
been that many of the present day statutes are inadequate. It is par-
ticularly apparent that the famous section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934 has long been i:n,_need of replacement or 
thorough revision. The purpose of this comment is to examine the 
past and possible future handling of the wiretapping problem by Con-
gress. 
I. The Problem in the Supreme Court 
Schwartz v. State4 is the most significant recent wiretapping case in 
a series of Supreme Court decisions which began in 1928.5 Wire-
tapping law has developed in such a crazy-quilt pattern that in recent 
years various executive departments have simultaneously interpreted 
and applied the present federal statute on wiretapping in several dif-
ferent ways.6 'In terms of favorable and unfavorable treatment, Su-
preme Court decisions involving wiretapping can be separated into 
three periods. From 1928 to 1937 the controlling principles were those 
laid down by the majority opinion in Olmstead v. United States,7 which 
held that tapping does not amount to an illegal "search" prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment, and consequently that evidence acquired by 
telephone taps was admissible in federal criminal proceedings. The 
dissenters (Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Butler) argued that there 
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 470, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928). 
243 Stat. L. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1946) §605. 
3 Statutes are collected in Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wire Tapping," 33 CoRN. L.Q. 
73 at 73-75 (1947). See also note 13 to Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438 at 479-481, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928), and 1931 survey prepared at the 
request of the attorney general, Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in 
Executive Departments, 71st Cong., 3d sess., pp. 5-16 (1931). 
4 344 U.S. 199, 73 S.Ct. 232 (1952). See also Schwartz v. State, (Tex. Crim. App. 
1952) 246 S.W. (2d) 174. 
5 A complete analysis of case law on wiretapping up to 1947 may be found in Rosen-
zweig, "The Law of Wire Tapping," 32 CoRN. L.Q. 514, 33 CoRN. L.Q. 73 (1947). 
6 See statement in "Congressional Wiretapping Policy Overdue," 2 STAN. L. REv. 
744 at 744 (1950): "The Attorney General believes Section 605 does not prohibit wire-
tapping; the Acting Secretary of the Treasury states that it does and that no wiretapping 
is used in Treasury Department investigations; the Postmaster General declines to comment 
because of the pending debates on the matter in Congress." See also criticism of Justice 
Department vacillations as to wiretapping policy in Helfeld, "A Study of Justice Depart-
ment Policies on Wiretapping," 9 LA.w. GUILD REv. 57 (1949). 
7 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928). 
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had been a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and also 
that the government should not use evidence obtained by acts violative 
of state law.8 The Olmstead decision was followed in the lower courts.9 
The second era of wiretapping jurisprudence was opened in 1937 
when the Supreme Court, in the £rst Nardone case,1° interpreted sec-
tion 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 193411 to require the 
exclusion of testimony by federal agents in a federal court as to the 
contents of an intercepted telephone message, since such testimony 
constitutes a "divulgence" of information contrary to the prohibition 
of the statute. Two other Supreme Court decisions in this period 
indicated a continuing desire to follow in spirit the stirring advice of 
the dissenters in the Olmstead case. The second Nardone case,12 
decided in 1939, extended the prohibition of section 605 to exclude 
evidence constituting "fruit of the poison tree" (information obtained 
through wiretap leads) from federal court proceedings, and in United 
States 11. W eiss13 the Court ruled that section 605 prohibits evidence 
in federal courts obtained by interception and divulgence of intrastate 
messages. 
Since 1942, however, Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the 
seemingly broad protection granted to defendants by the trend in earlier 
interpretations of section 605. Thus the Court has decided that only 
parties to the intercepted conversation have a right to object to the 
unlawful use of the information,14 that neither section 605 nor the 
Fourth Amendment bars evidence obtained by use of a detectaphone15 
or radio transmitter concealed on one of two conversants,16 and that 
section 605 does not operate to exclude evidence from state court pro-
ceedings.17 At various times in the latter two stages of this history, 
s Holmes in dissent did not deal with the constitutional issue; he thought that the 
government should not use evidence which in this case was obtained in violation of a 
Washington statute prohibiting wiretapping. The impassioned constitutional argument of 
Brandeis sought exclusion of evidence obtained by wiretapping, in accordance with the 
doctrine of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). 
9 Cases are collected in Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wiretapping," 32 CoRN. L.Q. 514 
at 533, n. 70 (1947). 
10 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275 (1937). 
1143 Stat. L. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1946) §605. 
12 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939). This result was 
reached on the theory controlling in search and seizure cases, as propounded in Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920). 
1a 308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269 (1939). 
14 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 62 S.Ct. 1000 (1942). 
15 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993 (1942). 
16 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952). The Court also ruled 
that the practice did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
11 Schwartz v. State, 344 U.S. 199, 73 S.Ct. 232 (1952). 
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dissenters have expressed a desire to reconsider the constitutional issue, 
uproot the Olmstead decision, and declare wiretapping violative of the 
Fourth Amenclment.18 
IL Intent and Policy of Congress as to Section 605-
Meaning of Schwartz v. State 
The intention of Congress in enacting section 605 has never been 
ascertained with much success. The broad language of the statutory 
prohibition-"no person . . . shall intercept any communication . . . 
and divulge [its contents] ... to any person"-appears to ban wire-
tapping and require exclusion of wiretapping evidence, but these very 
matters were seriously disputed in the first Nardone case.19 Nothing 
in the debates or committee reports on the Federal Communications 
Act of 1934 indicates that a rule of evidence pertaining to wiretapping 
was contemplated by the restrictions of this long unnoticed section of 
the statute. The committee report on the bill stated simply that section 
605 "is based upon Section 27 of the Radio Act and extends it to wire 
communications."20 The committee report on section 27 of the Radio 
Act of 192721 is not helpful in analyzing the congressional intention 
motivating adoption of section 605. The fact that many bills dealing 
specifically with wiretapping had been introduced in Congress in the 
interval between the Olmstead case in 1928 and the enactment of 
section 605 in 193422 seemed to be good support for the argument 
pressed in the first Nardone case that legislative history demonstrated 
18 A Texas statute involved in Schwartz v. State, 344 U.S. 199, 73 S.Ct. 232 (1952), 
which provides that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States 
should be inadmissible in court [Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1948) art. 727a], gave 
· Justices Frankfurter, concurring, and Douglas, dissenting, an opportunity to mention the 
constitutional point. Justice Douglas was of the opinion that the case should have been 
decided on the constitutional issue. Both justices referred to their dissents in On Lee v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952), in which they argued for the unconsti-
tutionality of evidence obtained by a concealed walkie-talkie set. A similar opportunity 
to overrule Olmstead was rejected by the Court in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 
129 at 135, 62 S.Ct. 993 (1942) (three of the eight participating justices expressed a 
willingness to overturn Olmstead). 
10 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275 (1937). See criticism of 
the decision in 53 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1940). 
20 S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934). The purpose of the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934 was to supersede the Federal Radio Commission Act and to bring 
wire and radio communications under the control of the Federal Communications 
Commission. 
21 H. Rep. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1927). 
22 These bills, evidencing protest at the policy established by the Olmstead case, 
either prohibited wiretapping or proscribed the use of evidence obtained by tapping. E.g., 
H.R. 4139, H.R. 5416, 71st Cong., 1st sess. (1929); S. 3344, S. 6061, 71st Cong., 3d 
sess. (1930); H.R. 23, H.R. 5305, H.R. 9893, S. 1396, 72d Cong., 1st sess. (1931-1932). 
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section 605 was not intended to apply to such a practice. The Supreme 
Court dismissed this contention, however, with a brisk reference to the 
broad language of the statute.23 
Another aspect of congressional intention was the decisive issue in 
the recent Supreme Court pronouncement on wiretapping, Schwartz 
v. State: was section 605 intended to ban wiretapping evidence in state 
courts? The Court answered in the negative, thereby affirming pre-
vious determinations of the issue by several state courts. 24 In support 
of the view that the statute applied to state tribunals, it has been argued 
that the literal wording of the statute covers any interception and di-
vulgence, whether such "divulgence" occurs in a federal or a state court. 
It has been contended that nothing in the statute, nor any policy 
consideration, indicates that "no person" was drafted with the intention 
of including witnesses in federal but not state courts. The strength of the 
statute has been said to be vitiated by inapplicability to state courts, since 
it is in the state tribunals that most criminal prosecutions, and hence most 
wiretapping questions, arise. On the other hand, the Supreme Court 
reasoned in the Schwartz case that there had not been a clear-cut ex-
pression of congressional intention to impose rules of evidence on state 
courts, and that a statute should not be extended by implication so as 
to supersede the exercise of state power. In handing down its first 
opinion on the inapplicability of section 605 to state proceedings,25 the 
23 "True it is that after this court's decision in the Olmstead case Congressional com-
mittees investigated the wire-tapping activities of federal agents. Over a period of several 
years bills were introduced to prohibit the practice, all of which failed to pass. • . . It is 
also true that the committee reports in connection with the Federal Communications Act 
dwell upon the fact that the major purpose of the legislation was the transfer of jurisdic-
tion over wire and radio communication to the newly constituted Federal Communications 
Commission. But these circumstances are, in our opinion, insufficient to overbear the plain 
mandate of the statute." Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 at 382-383, 58 S.Ct. 
275 (1937). It might also be pointed out that the two previous statutes which dealt with 
wiretapping specifically used the words "wiretap" or "tap." 47 Stat. L. 1381 (1933); 40 
Stat. L. 1017 (1918). 
24 Bratburd v. State, (Md. 1952) 88 A. (2d) 446; Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 
A. (2d) 706 (1942); Rowan v. State, 175 Md. 547, 3 A. (2d) 753 (1939); Black v. 
Impelliterri, 201 Misc. 371, 111 N.Y.S. (2d) 402 (1952); People v. Stemmer, 298 N.Y. 
28, 83 N.E. (2d) 141 (1948) (see note 25 infra); Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 
296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E. (2d) 854 (1946); People v. Channell, 107 Cal. App. (2d) 192, 
236 P. (2d) 654 (1951). Prior to the Channell case the California courts had decided 
several cases on the assumption that §605 does apply to the state courts. People v. Onofrio, 
65 Cal. App. (2d) 584, 151 P. (2d) 158 (1944); People v. Barnhart, 66 Cal. App. (2d) 
714, 153 P. (2d) 214 (1944); People v. Vertlieb, 22 Cal. (2d) 193, 137 P. (2d) 437 
(1943); People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. (2d) 169, 137 P. (2d) 1 (1943). 
25 The Supreme Court had before it the same issue (applicability of §605 to state 
courts) in 1949, when it affirmed by an equally divided bench (4-4) the holding in 
People v. Stemmer, 298 N.Y. 728, 83 N.E. (2d) 141 (1948). Stemmer v. New York, 
336 U.S. 963, 69 S.Ct. 936 (1949). In accordance with Supreme Court practice, no 
opinion was filed, so that the factors motivating the individual justices in that case are 
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Court skirted the constitutional issue which had intrigued cornmenta-
tors, 26 i.e., the existence of congressional power to enact rules of evi-
dence binding on the state courts. In view of Congress' previous 
reluctance to adopt any sort of wiretapping legislation, it is questionable 
whether the issue thus by-passed in the opinion will arise in the near 
future. 
Although the question of congressional power in this area has been 
rendered temporarily moot, the problem will lurk in the background 
should Congress some day become indignant at abuse of wiretapping by 
state police and attempt to outlaw the use of such evidence in state 
courts. Before the Schwartz case law review writers were in general 
accord that Congress does have the necessary power, if section 605 
were to be held applicable to state courts.27 Any constitutional issue 
of federal-state relationships naturally involves complicated questions 
of policy and the balancing of local and national interests. However, 
it would seem that control of telephone communications, especially in 
view of the decision in the Weiss case,28 is a sufficiently compelling 
objective of federal concern to warrant supersedure by Congress, should 
it attempt such an exercise of the commerce power in the future. 
Support for this proposition might be found in other areas in which 
Congress has passed laws, under various constitutionally granted 
powers, which have been held to regulate to some extent the rules of 
evidence in state courts. Thus, under the full faith and credit clause, 
Congress has enacted legislation prescribing certain rules of admissi-
bility for public and judicial records in state courts.29 Under the tax 
power, former federal laws excluding from evidence documents not 
bearing a revenue stamp have been held to apply in state courts30 
(although the weight of authority is contra31). Section 25(a)(9) of 
the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that no testimony of the bankrupt 
not ascertainable. This affirmance was not cited in Schwartz v. State, 344 U.S. 199, 73 
S.Ct. 232 (1952), although reference was made to the decision of the New York Court 
of Appeals (also reported without opinion). 
26 E.g., 33 CoRN. L.Q. 73 at 78 (1947); 37 Ju.. L. R:sv. 99 at 108, n. 23 (1942); 
40 J. CmM. L. 476 (1950); 3 MIAMI L. R:sv. 604 at 610 (1949); 34 ILL. L. R:sv. 758 
at 760 (1940); 18 N.C. L. R:sv. 229 (1940). Cf. 25 MINN. L. R:sv. 382 (1941). 
27Ibid. 
2s United States v. Weiss, 308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269 (1939). 
29 For judicial records, 62 Stat. L. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1738; 
nonjudicial records, 62 Stat. L. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1739. The 
same point may be made as to other sections of title 28, e.g., §1740. 
so Chartiers & Robinson Turnpike Co. v. McNamara, 72 Pa. 278 (1872); Muscatine 
v. Stememan, 30 Iowa 526 (1870). 
31 See 1 WIGMORll, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §205, n. 2 (1940); 18 N.C. L. R:sv. 229 at 
230, n. 6 (1940). 
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"shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding," 
has been held applicable to the state courts.32 And, in accordance with 
former Treasury Department regulations, Internal Revenue agents 
could not be compelled by state courts to testify as to certain matters. 33 
There is, of course, a strong states' -rights argument in opposition to 
this view. 
The opinion in the Schwartz case eliminated the touchy consti-
tutional problem on the fairly solid ground that Congress had mani-
fested no intention to make section 605 applicable to the states. As 
its meaning sifts down to the state police systems, however, the opinion 
may well be one additional factor in making more attractive the use, 
and eventual abuse,34 of wiretapping in the fight against crime. This 
might have the long-run result of arousing protest against invasion of 
the individual's privacy to the point where Congress or the state legis-
latures will find it desirable to respond with remedial legislation. In-
deed, the experience in New York, where police tapping authorized by 
court order is permitted, has shown that wiretapping easily lends itself 
to abuse.35 During the 1952 legislative session several bills curbing 
the present scope of legal wiretapping passed one of the two houses of 
the state legislature.36 
32 People v: Lay, 193 Mich. 17, 159 N.W. 299 (1916); People v. Elliott, 123 Misc. 
602, 206 N.Y.S. 54 (1924). See Clark v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 S. 135 (1914); State v. 
Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 87 N.E. (2d) 358 (1949). 
33 Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 20 S.Ct. 701 (1900). Instances where Con-
gress has regulated other aspects of procedure in state courts are cited in 34 ILL. L. RBv. 
758 at 761-762 (1940). 
34 The New York experiment, originated by constitutional amendment in 1938, au-
thorizing limited wiretapping on the same basis applicable to the issuance of search war• 
rants, has proved an initial disappointment to some, in terms of safeguarding individual 
liberties. See Westin, "The Wire Tapping Problem," 52 CoL. L. RBv. 165 at 192-197 
(1952). As to the inefficiency of the system, see news report of testimony by Harry Gross, 
famed Brooklyn gambler, who stated that he was tipped off in advance as to every tap the 
police placed in Brooklyn and New York. N.Y. T1MEs, March 25, 1952, p. 14:2. Gross 
obtained his information through a policeman who knew a stenographer working for the 
telephone company. See testimony of Miles F. McDonald, District Attorney of Kings 
County, Brooklyn, N.Y., in Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, [House] Committee on 
the Judiciary, on H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 
p. 75 (1953). 
35 See note 74 infra. And see Mellin, "I was a Wire Tapper," 222 SATORDAY EVE· 
NING PosT, Sept. 10, 1949, p. 19 at 57; 52 CoL. L. RBv. 165 at 195 (1952). 
36 The objectives of these bills were to permit judges to revoke their orders authorizing 
legal tapping after examination of results of the tapping; to prohibit judges from isming, 
and other persons from seeking, warrants for tapping outside the immediate jurisdiction; 
and to ban the use of evidence obtained by illegal tapping in any criminal proceedings. 
See N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1952, p. 22:5; Feb. 19, 1952, p. 19:2; March 8, 1952, p. 30:1; 
March 14, 1952, p. 17:1. 
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III. Congressional History Prior to 1934 
Section 605 was the third of the three laws which Congress has 
passed concerning wiretapping. The first piece of legislation was a 
wartime measure enacted in 1918 at a time when the government was 
operating the telephone system. This statute prohibited in broad terms 
all wiretapping.37 The motivation behind the adoption of the statute 
was apparently a congressional fear that the secrecy of governmental 
activities was being jeopardized by tapping.38 The statute by its own 
terms expired when the government returned control of the telephone 
system to its private owners, which occurred in July 1919.39 The 
second federal statute was passed in the form of a rider to an appropri-
ation bill in 1933, stating that "no part of this appropriation shall be 
used for or in connection with 'wiretapping' to procure evidence of 
violations of the National Prohibition Act."40 This act followed un-
successful attempts during the four years following the Olmstead case 
(1929-1932) to get bills through Congress prohibiting tapping by 
federal authorities. 41 The third and last federal law on the subject 
was section 605. It thus appears that through 1934 all congressional 
efforts in the wiretapping area were directed toward forbidding inter-
ception. 
IV. Congressional History Since the Nardone Decision 
Since the ruling in the first Nardone case in 1937 more than thirty 
bills, resolutions, and joint resolutions dealing with .wiretapping have 
been introduced in Congress.42 The nature of these bills has been the 
opposite of the early series of proposals, for the most of the proposed 
wiretapping legislation introduced in the 75th Congress through the 
37 ''That whoever ••• shall, without authority and without the knowledge and consent 
of the other users • . • tap any telegraph or telephone line • . ." would thereby commit a 
federal offense. 40 Stat. L. 1017 (1918). 
38 See "Wiretapping, Congress and. the Department of Justice,'' 9 INT. JuRID. AssN. 
BUL. 97 at 101 (1941). 
so 41 Stat. L. 157 (1919). 
4o 47 Stat. L. 1381 (1933). 
41 See note 22 supra. 
42 In addition to those mentioned in the notes infra, see H.R. 9898, 75th Cong., 3d 
sess. (1938); H.R. 4048, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949); H.J. Res. 553, 76th Cong., 3d 
sess. (1940) (amended by H.J. Res. 571); H.J. Res. 41, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1943); S. 
595, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949) (reported back without the wiretapping provision); S. 
4154, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) (this bill, applying only to the District of Columbia, 
was drafted on the model of the New York statute); H.R. 4404, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 
(1951) (this bill prohibited the recording of telephone messages by federal employees). Note 
also that the Senate Crime Investigating Committee recommended wiretap-authorizing 
legislation. S. Rep. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1951). 
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83d Congress has attempted in some limited manner to authorize 
tapping by federal officials. Throughout this period the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies have carried on the 
practice of intercepting messages in certain kinds of cases,43 with 
varying interpretations of how much leeway section 605 allows federal 
authorities outside of the well-settled ban against use of wiretapping 
evidence in the courts.44 Most of the bills introduced in this period 
have been drafted in the interests of national security and many have 
been administration-sponsored. The bills proposed in the current 
Congress are basically similar to those of previous years.45 
These thirty some proposals have not met with overwhelming suc-
cess. Four of them, however, have passed at least one house. The 
:6.rst of these came the closest to enactment, in 1938, when a bill de-
signed to avoid the result of the :6.rst Nardone decision was approved in 
both houses.46 This proposal authorized wiretapping by federal em-
ployees if the head of any executive department or independent agency 
reasonably believed that a felony against the United States was about 
to be committed, prevention of which was under his supervision. Be-
cause of a minor variation in terms, which was not cured before ad-
journment, this bill never became law.47 In the following Congress, 
the Senate, acting upon complaints that the wires of political leaders 
were being tapped, passed a resolution directing an investigation into 
such practices.48 Hearings held in accordance with this resolution 
produced over 1,000 pages of testimony.49 During this same session 
of the 76th Congress, in 1940, a House joint resolution authorizing 
the FBI to wiretap in certain situations in the interest of national de-
43 Of many examples which might be offered on this point, see as illustrative the 
findings of Ryan, J., in United States v. Coplon, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 921 at 
924-926, and the reading of Bureau of Internal Revenue memoranda on recorded telephone 
conversations in the House Ways and Means Committee investigation into the recent tax 
scandals, N.Y. T1MEs, March 28, 1952, p. 12:3. 
44 See criticisms of executive department handling of the problem expressed in the 
articles cited in note 6 supra. 
45 S. 832, H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953). See also 
H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), drafted by the Department of Justice. 
46 S. 3756 (see S. Rep. No. 1790, H. Rep. No. 2656), 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938). 
Passage: Senate, 83 CoNG. lli;c. 7053 (1938); House, 83 CoNG. REc. 9453 (1938) 
(debate at 9636). The bill also made it criminal to use communications facilities in the 
commission of any felony against the United States. 
47 The House added to the Senate version a paragraph prescribing a penalty for 
unauthorized tapping or divulgence by federal employees. 
48 S. Res. 224 (see also S. Res. 323, which was defeated), 76th Cong., 3d sess. 
(1940). This resolution ripened into an investigation of wiretapping in Rhode Island, 
Philadelphia, and New York. 
49 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the [Senate] Committee on Interstate Com-
merce, 76th Cong., 3d sess., parts I and II (1940), 77th Cong., 1st sess., part ill (1941). 
438 1.\lhcmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 52 
fense passed the House but died in the Senate.50 The mounting 
tension in international affairs in 1941 and the entrance of the United 
States into war, together with subsequent allegations that the Pearl 
Harbor disaster could have been avoided· if wiretapping by federal 
authorities had been permitted,51 stimulated a B.ock of bills and resolu-
tions during the 77th Congress.52 In the 1941 hearings on these pro-
posals, the proponents were generally personnel from the Justice De-
partment and the opponents were generally persons representing vari-
ous civil rights and labor groups.53 In June 1941, a House bill came up 
for a vote but was defeated.54 In the following year, however, a joint 
resolution authorizing tapping by the FBI and the intelligence units 
of the armed forces in investigations of suspected sabotage, treason, 
seditious conspiracy, espionage, and violation of the neutrality laws, 
passed the House;55 but again the bill died in the Senate. No B.oor 
action was ever taken on any of the -bills proposed since that time. 
The content of these thirty legislative proposals has not varied a 
great deal from bill to bill. (1) As to the persons authorized to inter-
cept messages, the bill referred to above which -passed both houses (in 
slightly different form) was, oddly enough, one of the most far-reaching 
proposals, in that it permitted tapping upon the issuance of a certificate 
by the head of any executive department or independent agency. Later 
bills specifically limited the agencies whose employees were permitted 
to tap (generally restricted to the FBI and the intelligence units of the 
armed forces56), although other bills gave authorization to "any in-
50 H.J. Res. 571 (see H. Rep. No. 2574 and H. Res. 537), 76th Cong., 3d sess. (1940). 
51 In the 77th Cong., 1st sess., Senator Truman vigorously defended Senator Wheeler, 
chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee (to which most wiretapping bills were 
referred) against criticisms on this point. See 88 CoNG. REc. 947 (1942). 
52 S. Res. 97, H.R. 2266, H.R. 3099, H.R. 4228, H.R. 6919 (related problem), H.J. 
Res. 273, H.J. Res. 283, H.J. Res. 304, H.J. Res. 310, H. Res. 222, H. Res. 487 (pro-
cedural), 77th Cong., 1st and 2d sess. (1941-1942). 
53 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, [House] Committee on the Judiciary, on 
H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). After the United States entered 
the war, representatives of both of these groups voiced approval of some restricted govern-
mental tapping necessary for prosecution of the war. See letters of Phillip Murray, president 
of the C.I.O., and the American Civil Liberties Union, in Hearings on H.J. Res. 283, 77th 
Cong., 2d sess., p. 13 (1942). 
54 H.R. 4228, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), defeated by a 154-147 vote, 87 CoNG. 
REc. 5793 (1941). 
55 H.J. Res. 310, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942); passed House, 88 CoNG. REc. 4602 
(1942). 
56 E.g., H.R. 4228, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941); H.J. Res. 273, H.J. Res. 283, H.J. 
Res. 304, H.J. Res. 310, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942) (H.J. Res. 273 included the 
intelligence unit of the State Department also); S. 595, H.R. 3563, H.R. 4124, 81st Cong., 
1st sess. (1949); H.R. 406, H.R. 479, H.R. 1947, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); S. 832, 
H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953). 
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vestigatorial agency forming a part of [any executive] department,"57 
to "any person employed in the investigation, detection, or prevention 
of offenses against the United States,"58 to "departments and agencies 
designated by the President,"59 and to any "law-enforcement officer."60 
(2) Most of the bills have required that some official permission operate 
as a condition precedent to authorized tapping. Some of the early bills 
gave such responsibility to the head of the particular department or 
agency, while most have vested this function wholly or partly in the 
attorney general. One early proposal required governmental tappers 
to obtain permission from the judge of any United States or state court 
or a United States commissioner.61 Some bills in the most recent 
Congresses have required, in addition to supervision by the attorney 
general, permission granted by a federal judge.62 (3) The crimes 
which are considered to be of such import as to legitimatize govern-
mental tapping have varied somewhat. Originally the offenses in-
cluded in the proposals were violations of "any criminal law of the 
United States,"63 but this was cut down in one bill to any federal 
"felony,"04 and in another to federal felonies "relating to th~ national 
defense."65 The eventual practice became one of listing the specific 
offenses. This began with kidnapping, extortion, espionage, and sabo-
tage, but today the category usually consists of sabotage, treason, se-
ditious conspiracy, espionage, violations of the act requiring registration 
of agents of foreign principals, violations of the act requiring regis-
tration of organizations carrying on certain activities, and, in some bills, 
violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 66 One bill included 
"offenses punishable by death." ( 4) Certain other aspects have been 
dealt with in some of the proposals. For example, interception itself 
(as opposed to the conjunctive "intercept and divulge") would be 
illegal unless in accordace with statutory authorization, or else divulg-
ence would be singled out as the forbidden conduct. Section 605 
would be specifically amended, or tapping authorizations would be 
57H.R. 2266, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). 
58 H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). 
59 S. 2833, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948). This bill covered only communications of 
or to foreign governments. 
60 H.R. 3644, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949). 
61 H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1949). 
62 The £rst of these was H.R. 3563, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949). 
63 S. 3756, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938). 
64 H.R. 2266, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). 
65 H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). 
66 E.g., H.R. 1947, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951). The three specific statutes referred 
to may be found at 52 Stat. L. 631 (1938), 54 Stat. L. 1201 (1940), and 60 Stat. L. 755 
(1946). 
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made "without regard to Section 605." Evidence obtained by inter-
ception would be admissible in criminal and civil proceedings to which 
the United States is a party, or else the information would be made 
admissible in criminal actions only. Unauthorized possession of tap-
ping equipment would be declared unlawful. Interception, by negative 
implication, would be permissible if authorized by one of the parties to 
the communication.67 Tapping would be permitted "in the conduct 
of investigations involving the safety of human life." Tapping of the 
wires of foreign governments would be allowed. Most of the bills have 
proposed effective sanctions for compliance with their terms, with the 
penalty for unauthorized or abusive wiretapping in contravention of 
the law generally $10,000 and two years imprisonment or both. None 
of the bills have purported to deal with evidence in the state courts. 
The common thread running through these measures which have 
been presented to Congress in the past :fifteen years, with the exception 
of several resolutions directing investigations into certain specific in-
stances of alleged wiretapping,68 has been the desire on the part of the 
sponsors to obtain congressional sanction of limited governmental 
tapping, generally in the name of national security. In none of the 
proposals has there appeared the apprehension which motivated the 
anti-wiretapping bills thrown into the hopper before 1934, and which 
prompted Congress to adopt the 1933 appropriation rider forbidding 
federal funds to be used for wiretapping purposes in enforcement of 
prohibition laws. It should be noted that the draftsmen of the more 
recent proposals have taken the care to define in fairly broad terms the 
word "person" which has caused so much difficulty in interpreting 
section 605.69 Also of interest is a provision in recent proposed legisla-
tion which successfully avoids one of the major problems of section 
605, in that it expressly outlaws interception alone, as distinguished 
from interception plus divulgence, unless authorized by the act. 70 
67 See, in this connection, the interesting difference in view in the opinions of Judges 
Clark and Learned Hand in United States v. Polakoff, (2d Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 888, 
as to the meaning of the terms "sender" and "interception" in §605 when one party to a 
conversation has consented to a recording. These radio terms were included in the Radio 
Act from which §605 came, which perhaps helps to explain why application to wiretapping, 
at least in the case of the word "sender," is so difficult of interpretation. 
68 H.R. 359, 75th Cong., 2d sess. (1937); S. Res. 224, 76th Cong., 3d sess. (1940). 
69 H.R. 408, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), is typical: "Sec. 9. For purposes of this 
Act the term 'person' shall include any individual, partnership, association, business trust, 
corporation, or any organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not." 
70 "No person, other than those authorized pursuant to this Act shall intercept, listen 
in on, or record telephone, telegraph, cable, radio, or any other similar message or com-
munication, unless transmitted for the use of the general public or authorized by one of 
the parties to such message or communication, or his employment as a part of the message 
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However, it is doubtful that any of these measures were drafted with a 
conscious intention to provide a workable wiretapping law applicable 
to all persons, including state officials as well as federal employees. 
The extent to which state law permits limited tapping has not been 
dealt with in the bills. In view of the holding in the Schwartz case, 
any contemplated statute establishing a comprehensive wiretapping law 
binding on state officers should be explicit in expressing legislative in-
tention to include such persons. 
V. Conclusions 
Wiretapping always has been an exceedingly controversial subject. 
Certain facets of tapping have often been discussed in the committee 
rooms and on the Hoor in Washington. In answer to demands made 
by administrators for limited authorization to tap, the critics find their 
most persuasive weapon in the ringing warning of Justice Brandeis: 
"And it is also immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law 
enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our 
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are· 
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel 
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest 
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well-meaning but without understanding."71 
Despite this Hag of caution, it is understandable why, during recent 
years of constant international tension, demands for some authorized 
wiretapping in the interests of national security have continued; the 
climate prevailing in earlier periods has changed. 72 Limitations in the 
present law on wiretapping have hamstrung the federal government 
in its efforts to bring to punishment persons guilty of serious crimes 
against the United States.73 
or communication system requires such action." H.R. 408, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953). 
Despite this all-inclusive language, it is questionable whether this section would be con-
strued by the courts in such a way as to reach a result contrary to the Schwartz case. 
71 Dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 479, 48 S.Ct. 
564 (1928). 
72 "The committee would hesitate to allow wires or short wave messages to be tapped 
in times of normalcy. We are, however, in a national emergency. Some sacrifices must be 
made. Some rights have to be yielded." H. Rep. No. 2574 (accompanying H.J. Res. 
571), 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 2 (1940). 
73 Attorney General Brownell has stated publicly that the Justice Department has 
evidence against "several people who have betrayed the United States," but cannot legally 
prosecute them because of the ban on wiretap evidence. N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1953, p. 
10:4. Typifying the difficulties faced by the government are the results in the Judith 
Coplon cases. Coplon v. United States, (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629; Coplon v. 
United States, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 749. 
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The reluctance of many to acquiesce in the demands for legalized 
tapping, unless thoroughly reliable safeguards are provided at the same 
time, may largely be traced to a fear that governmental tapping, although 
designed with the good intention to ferret out disloyal offenders, 
will be one more efficient instrument in the gradual invasion by the 
state of the individual's ·privacy. In addition, the probability that 
governmental interception of communications, even though narrowly 
confined and strictly regulated, will have the contagious effect of 
spreading to others the desire to use this effective but somewhat un-
ethical means of obtaining information has no doubt played an im-
portant role in obstructing passage of any federal wiretapping legislation 
since 1934. . 
Congress will be confronted with many considerations of policy 
and practice, whether its next attempt to enact a wiretapping statute is 
wide or narrow in scope. At present, two competing ideas dominate 
the scene: the need and desire of the government for tapping authori-
zation in certain pin-pointed areas of crime against the nation, and the 
need and desire of the public for realistic protection against all un-
authorized or abusive tapping.74 These two ideas could.be harmonized 
in a single statute.75 Any such statute, however, should emerge as the 
product of intense congressional scrutiny of all aspects of wiretapping; 
74 It should be anticipated that abuse may some day How from permitted use. E.g., 
police in New York occasionally have used wiretapping methods for improper purposes. 
"We found in the course of our investigation in the Gross case ••. that police officers 
without any instruction were buying their own wiretapping equipment. They would sit on 
a telephone such as a coin booth near a baseball park or near a race track, and when they 
heard people call up to make a bet they would forward that to another plainclothes 
detective, who would then go and shake that bookmaker down. But that was all unauthor-
ized tapping." Testimony of Miles F. McDonald, District Attorney of Kings County, 
Brooklyn, N.Y., in Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, [House] Committee on the 
Judiciary, on H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 86 
(1953). 
75 Cf. discussion of Congressman Keating, chairman of the subcommittee, and William 
P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General of the United States, in 1953 hearings, id. at 39: 
"Mn. K:eATING: How do you feel about the imposition of penalties for unauthorized 
interception of communications? 
MR. RooEns: ••• The difficulty now is that the law is so nebulous that it's very 
difficult to obtain successful prosecutions under it .... 
I do think, though, that if we can avoid tying it up here we'd prefer it .... 
. . . if we had a clear-cut law, we certainly would proceed against wiretappers. 
MR. KEATING: It would seem to me that it would be appropriate to deal with this 
problem in a single piece of legislation. • • • The purpose in mind, I believe, of the authors 
of all these bills is definitely two-fold: 
(I) To lay down the narrow class of cases in which this wiretapping will be per-
mitted and the very definite procedures which must be followed to obtain permission; and 
(2) On the other hand, to say, after those lines have been laid down, anybody that 
steps outside those bounds is going to face stiff and severe penalties. 
And I think it would facilitate the passage of the legislation to have both of those 
problems at a single time, regardless of the language of any particular bills before us." 
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in recent years, and especially in the 1953 hearings on the subject, 
much the heavier accent seems to have been placed upon the immediate 
goal-authorization of governmental tapping. The likelihood that 
Congress will consider only the limited objective of governmental 
tapping was probably strengthened by developments in the November 
1953 investigation into the so-called "Harry Dexter White case," in 
which Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., repeated earlier re-
quests to make admissible wiretap evidence in cases involving violations 
of the espionage laws.76 Although the recognized desirability of such 
authorization is great, it will be unfortunate if the first federal wire-
tapping law in approximately twenty years is hastily considered legis-
lation dictated by the temper of the times and enacted without effective 
complementary safeguards. 
Many facts essential to intelligent formulation of legislative policy 
have not been completely brought to light in congressional hearings. 
The hearings held three days in the summer of 1953 before a sub-
committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary77 were enlight-
ening, but technically this committee did not have authority to con-
sider amendment of section 605.78 Thus it seems fair to conclude that 
not all the ramifications of a revamped congressional position on wire-
tapping were examined. For example, the problem of whether the 
federal government should affirmatively attempt to regulate interception 
of communications at the state and private level, neglected to a great 
extent by Congress in recent years, did not receive extensive treatment. 
Not until the decision in the Schwartz case was the issue determined 
whether Congress already had dealt with wiretapping in state legal 
systems; this may explain the unconcern of some who might otherwise 
have sought legislative limitation of abusive tapping by state operators. 
Although the issue of the Schwartz case has become a dead letter as a 
matter of judicial determination, it persists as an object of congressional 
concern. 
A new wiretap law based op inadequate study might well raise a host 
of problems as confusing as those which have been litigated under 
section 605. That Congress has sufficient power to enact effective 
76 Testimony before [Senate] Internal Security Subcommittee, November 17, 1953. 
Reported in N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1953, p. 22:2. And see note 73 supra. 
77 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, [House] Committee on the Judiciary, on H.R. 
408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953). 
78 Properly the concern of the [House] Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce. The five bills introduced in the 83d Congress, 1st sess. (1953) would permit 
governmental tapping "notwithstanding" or "without regard to the limitations contained 
in" §605. 
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legislation seems sure; that it has the desire and patience to do so is a 
much different matter. Commentators have urged that Congress fill 
the gaping breaches in wiretapping law, and have offered specific 
legislative proposals.79 It is to be hoped that Congress will discard the 
limited type of study of proposed laws on wiretapping which has 
marked legislative history in the past decade and a half, and will instead 
attempt a penetrative inquiry into the possibilities of a comprehensive 
overhauling of the rather mysterious section 605.80 The appearance in 
the 1953 hearings of the district attorney of Kings County, New York, 
in which he explained in precise detail the mechanics and effectiveness 
of New York procedure for obtaining court orders authorizing state 
· wiretapping, represents a firm step in the right direction. 
If such a full-scale inquiry were to yield a statutory law drafted in 
clear terms and with well-defined scope, the public as well as the exe-
cutive and judicial branches of the government would no longer be 
obliged to scrape to find a nonexistent congressional intent. Then for 
the first time it would be possible to point to a proclaimed legislative 
policy on the many phases of wiretapping, and the courts would no 
longer have to throw up their hands in dealing with nebulous legis-
lation. 
Richard W. Pogue, S.Ed. 
79 Westin, ''The Wire Tapping Problem," 52 CoL. L. REv. 165 (1952); 2 STAN. 
L. R:sv. 744 (1950). 
so A proposed scope schedule for congressional investigation was offered by Helfeld, "A 
Study of Justice Department Policies on Wiretapping," 9 LAw. GmLD R:sv. 57 at 68-69 
(1949). 
